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Review of Route Selections for the Federal Aid
Highway Systems
Roger Tippy*
INTRODUCTION
When the highway designated as U. S.2 in Eastern Montana became
too old and narrow for its traffic, the State Highway Commission began
planning a replacement. Several alternative routes were studied between
Poplar and Brockton. A public hearing was held on one alternative:
rebuilding the road partially along the existing route line (the Middle
Route). The other alternatives were to rebuild completely along the
existing route (the South Route) or to run a new road several miles
north of the existing route (the North Route).
After surveys indicated lowest construction costs-by a very slight
margin-for the North Route, the Commission passed a resolution declaring the land for the North Route to be necessary for the public use.
The Commission then brought eminent domain proceedings against the
property needed for the North Route. Several affected landowners denied the public necessity of the taking.
In order to take property, a condemnor must establish necessity.
However, in most states, the determination of necessity for major highway construction purposes is assigned to the discretion of the state highway department. A court may find lack of necessity only when the defendant proves that the highway department arrived at its determination of necessity in an arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent manner,
amounting to an abuse of discretion.1
In Montana, however, public necessity is a question for judicial
rather than administrative determination. A resolution of the Highway
Commission that certain land is necessary creates in court a disputable
presumption. 2 When a defendant introduces evidence of lack of necessity,
the court must decide whether the presumption in favor of the Commission has been overcome. 3 - As-an element of necessity, state law requires
that the proposed public use be located in a manner "compatible with
the greatest public good and the least private injury. ' 4 A statement to
this effect is included in the Commission's resolution of necessity and
enjoys the same disputable presumption of truth.5
*Legal research associate, The Conservation Foundation, Washington, D. C. Member
of District of Columbia Bar. B.A., Stanford University, 1962; L.L.B., Yale University, 1965.
'Helstad, Recent Trends in Highway Condemnation Law, 1964 WASH. U. L. Q. 58,
60; NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.11(3) (3rd Ed. 1950).
2REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 32-1615. (Hereafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA
will be cited R.C.M..)
8
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9911; State Highway Comm'n v. Yost Farm Co., 142 Mont. 239,
384 P.2d 277, 280 (1963).
'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9906.
5
R.C.M. 1947, § 32-1615.
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This element was attacked by the defending property owners between Poplar and Brockton. They introduced evidence that a new highway along the existing route-the South Route-would take little private property, while the North Route would destroy or severely damage
much valuable farm land.
The district court held for the property owners, finding that the
North Route was not compatible with the greatest public good and the
least private injury. The Highway Commission appealed to the supreme
court. The most recent decision in that court construing the same statutes,
State Highway Commission v. Crossen-Nissen Co.,6 was an encouraging
precedent for the Commission. There, as in the instant case, the district
court had found no necessity for a new routing of U. S. 2. In CrossenNissen the defendants had introduced much evidence to show that a reconstruction along the present route would cause less private injury, but
the supreme court reversed and approved the Commission's necessity
resolution. The court held that the disputable presumption could be
overcome only by clear and convincing proof of abuse of discretion or
arbitrary action by the Highway Commission. The court stated that "it
was not the function of the judiciary to determine as an engineer the
best place for the construction of a highway," and that "even when necessity has been challenged on the ground of arbitrariness or excessiveness
of the taking, there is left largely to the discretion of the condemnor the
''7
location, route, and area of the land to be taken.
But in the instant case, State Highway Commission v. Danielsen,"
the supreme court affirmed the decision of the district court. The Commission's failure to evaluate the degrees of private injury on each route
was held to be arbitrary action and abuse of discretion.
In effect, the property owner in Crossen-Nissen was told that his evidence on the comparative merits of the routing alternatives was worth
little. The principal issue before the court was one of procedure: was the
Commission's act arbitrary and an abuse of discretion? In Danielsen the
issue was cost in the same procedural terms but the court really passed
on the substantive issue, the comparative merits of the routes. "The conclusion would appear to be," said the court, "that the present route, if
it be equal in terms of public good to the other two routes, should be
selected because it involves the least private injury." 9
The Court in Danielsen attempted to distinguish its Crossen-Nissen
precedent in these words:
In Crossen-Nissen the contest was, as it is here, the proposed

route versus the existing route. In that case, however, there was not
the degree of private injury threatened that is present in this case.
Only one landowner was involved in Crossen-Nissen. Complained of
was a stretch of about one-half miles of right of way. In the case at
bar a number of property owners are involved occupying virtually the
entire 14.2 miles of the proposed route. Damage to farm land will be
severe. The evidence indicates that the farm of at least one of the
0145 Mont. 251, 400 P.2d 283 (1965).
7
Id., at 285.
822 St. Rptr. 1110, 409 P.2d 443 (Mont. 1965).
'Id. at 446.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss2/2
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defendants will be almost totally destroyed. As to the "public good"
aspect in Crossen-Nissen, the evidence revealed no reason to consider
the existing line equal or superior to the proposed route. In short,
there was not the clear and convincing proof of lack of necessity or
inconsistency with the greatest public good and least private harm
necessary to establish abuse of discretion and arbitrary action.' 0

The distinction is strained. The number of landowners protesting,
or the amount of land involved, should not determine the scope of judicial review. The logical extension of such reasoning is to draw an
illogical line somewhere: to say, for instance, that five landowners opposing a five-mile highway may introduce evidence on the superiority of
another route but that four landowners opposing a four-mile highway
may not. The other stated difference in Crossen-Nissen was that the
evidence "revealed no reason to consider the existing line equal or
superior to the proposed route."" The court said this although the facts
given in the Crossen-Nissen opinion recount evidence at the trial that rebuilding the existing route would cost less for construction and would
take less land off the county tax base.
Danielsen is a better statement of the law. This conclusion is impelled
by reading the relevant statutes. "Disputable presumption" is defined
in the code as a presumption which "may be controverted by other evidence.' 1 2 The court has defined this clause as follows:
In this jurisdiction civil cases are to be decided according to
the greater weight of the evidence, and a bare preponderance in
favor of the party holding the affirmative of the issue is sufficient
to warrant, and should warrant, a decision in his favor [citing cases].
Therefore, when the evidence preponderates against a disputable presumption, it 'fades away in the face of contrary facts.' [citing
cases]'

There is nothing here to support a requirement of "clear and convincing"
evidence to rebut the presumption; a mere preponderance will suffice.
And the defndant's evidence may directly rebut the Commission's case
rather than have to rebut it indirectly by proving procedural arbitrariness or abuse of discretion.
The court in Crossen-Nissen was attempting to mark out a very restricted role for the judiciary in highway location controversies. In the
great majority of states, the highway department does have the discretion
to lay highways where it chooses and the courts may interfere only when
there is clearly arbitrary action or an abuse of discretion. But Montana
is one of a handful of states which have imposed external checks on and
reviews of the actions of its highway department. Besides the judicial
determination of necessity 4 which comes into play only when a landowner chooses to resist condemnation, the powers of the Montana Highway Commission are restricted in the following ways:
101bid.

"State Highway Comm'n v. Crossen-Nissen Co., supra note 6.
-'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-7.
"In re Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 535, 19 P.2d 1051, 1054 (1933), quoted in
State Highway Comm'n v. Yost Farm Co., supra note 3, at 282.
"This determination is made only when the landowner chooses to resist condemnation
by introducing evidence to rebut the presumption of necessity, note 3 supra.
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(a) the Commission must secure the approval of the Department
of Fish and Game for highway construction which may affect
fish or wildlife habitats.15 If the Highway Commission refuses to
accept the recommendations of the Fish and Game Department,
the Fish and Game Department may demand arbitration;16
(b) highway construction within the limits of an incorporated
municipality must have the approval of the local governing
body;17 and
(c) highway construction bypassing or diverting traffic from
an incorporated town must be approved by the town government, except that no such approval is required for the construction of Interstate System highways.'"
A brief survey of the federal-aid highway program is necessary to
understand why Montana, as opposed to most other states, has imposed
such restrictions on its highway department.
THE FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACTS
*Federal subsidies for highway construction were first provided by
the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916.19 Under this program up to fifty per
cent of the construction costs of primary highways and secondary roads
was financed by the federal government. The Interstate Highway System was chartered in 194420 but progressed slowly as long as the same
fifty per cent maximum aid was available for the big superhighways.
The turning point was the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,21 which
raised the federal share of Interstate System highways to ninety per cent.
At the same time, the Highway Trust Fund was created 22 to collect
gasoline and auto excise taxes and other highway user taxes, and to pay
out the subsidies as required. The trust fund is a source of great strength
for the highway builders, for Congress has little control over the use of
the fund. Congress can only vote every year or two on a package appropriation from the fund for all highways during the appropriation
period.23 Aid for other public works, such as dams and canals, requires
specific project authorization from Congress, but a Congressman can do
nothing to influence the location of a particular federal-aid highway in
his district except vote against federal aid to highways as a whole.
The Secretary of Commerce, through the Bureau of Public Roads,
administers the highway aid program from Washington. As to planning
and locating specific routes, the Bureau of Public Roads plays a passive
role. All highway construction proposals are to be planned by the state
'5R.C.M.
'8R.C.M.
1
-R.C.M.
-R.C.M.

1947,
1947,
1947,
1947,

§
§
§
§

26-1501
26-1507
32-4305
32-1628

139 Stat. 355 (1916).

(1965 supp.).
(1965 supp.).
(1965 supp.).
(1965 supp.).
See SMERK, URBAN TRANSPORTATION: THE FEDERAL ROLE ch. 6

(1965).
258 Stat. 838 (1944).
- 7 0 Stat. 378 (1956).
70 Stat. 397 (1956), 23 U.S.C. § 120 (1965).
Stat. 889 (1958), as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 104(b) (1965).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss2/2
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highway departments, in accordance with state law. 24 The Bureau of
Public Roads can withhold approval of a particular state proposal but
it cannot directly dictate the location of a highway. The Bureau may
indirectly influence state location decisions by refusing to approve route
alternates other than the one it favors.25 The Bureau publishes a map of
the Interstate System which appears to have defined the location of
routes in that system. But the lines on this map are general guidelines
26
only.
When a state highway department and the Federal Highway Administrator sign a project agreement to build a section of one of the systems, the federal funds must be paid out by the end of the second year
after the agreement is signed.2 7 Delay beyond this date causes the federal share to lapse and to be reapportioned among the other states. 2
This practice has two effects: state highway departments build highways
in small cautious sections; and the threat of losing federal money creates
strong pressure to bend state policies and laws in the way that will most
quickly build the highway. 29 Congress strengthened the time-pressure
element for the Interstate System with a declaration of policy in the 1965
Act hereafter cited as the "urgency clause" :30
It is hereby declared that the prompt and early completion of
the National System of Defense and Interstate Highways . . . is
essential to the national interest and is one of the most important
objectives of this Act. It is the intent of Congress that the Interstate
System be completed as nearly as practicable over the period of
availability of the fifteen years' appropriations authorized for the
purpose of expediting its construction . . . and that the entire System
in all States be brought to simultaneous completion.

The unfortunate outcome is that highway engineers frequently pro-

pose routing an interstate along the cheapest and straightest of alternative routes. They are under pressure from the Bureau of Public Roads to
complete the Interstate System by 1972, the Bureau is under fiscal pressure to prefer the cheapest route, 31 and the federal law contains no mandate to spend extra money to preserve amenities or to seek the greatest
public good and least private injury.
Congress has provided some guidelines for the proper use of high2172 Stat. 887 (1958),

as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1965).
5Note, Pressures in the Process of Administrative Decision: A Sfudy of Highway
Location, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 534, 556 (1960).
28Supra note 24. See Levin, Federal Aspects of the Interstate Highway Program, 38
NEB. L. REv. 377 (1958).

772 Stat. 897 (1958), 23 U.S.C. § 118(b) (1965).
123 U.S.C. § 118(c) (1965).
"In State Highway Comm'n v. Yost Farm Co., supra note 3, the Highway Commission
signed a project agreement before it asked the district court for a necessity order.
When the district court found no necessity, the Commission argued on appeal that
Montana law should be tortuously construed in order to protect the project agreement
and the federal money. The Supreme Court of Montana rejected the Commission's
arguments but courts in other states have strained to keep the highway subsidies
from lapsing. See, e.g., Woolley v. State Highway Comm'n, .... Wyo ...... , 387 P.2d
667, 674 (1963); Brown v. MeMorran, 23 App. Div. 2d, 661, 257 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1965).
172 Stat. 885 (1958), as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1965).
'By present estimates, the Highway Trust Fund is not going to stretch far enough
to finish the system. 112 CoNG. REC. A920 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1966).
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way money. Section 109(a) of Title 23 imposes a duty upon the Secretary of Commerce in these terms :32
The Secretary shall not approve plans and specifications for proposed projects on any Federal-aid system if they fail to provide for a
facility (1) that will adequately meet the existing and probable future traffic needs and conditions in a manner conducive to safety,
durability, and economy of maintenance; (2) that will be designed
and constructed in accordance with standards best suited to accomplish the foregoing objectives and to conform to the particular needs
of each locality.
Section 133(b) of the same title, added in 1962, 3 3 directs the Secretary
to require the state highway departments to give "satisfactory assurance"
that relocation advisory assistance will be provided for the resettlement
of persons displaced by highway construction. Section 134, also added
in 1962, 3 4 states that the Secretary shall not approve federal-aid highway projects in urban areas of more than fifty thousand population
"unless he finds that such projects are based on a continuing comprehensive transportation process" which incorporates various modes of transport.
Section 1283 5 requires every project application from a state highway department to include a certification that public hearings have been
held or offered when a highway is to pass through or bypass an incorporated city, town, or village. It also requires the state highway department to certify that it has considered the economic effect of its proposed
route on the affected community. Hearings must be held or offered, but
without the accompanying consideration of economic effects, for all other
projects."6 The Secretary may not pay any subsidies for a project not
3 7
covered by a project agreement.
These are the principal guidelines by which the federal highway engineers review the decisions of the state highway engineers. The Bureau
seeks to discourage any other state authority from having a voice in the
operations of the state highway departments. Section 302, provides that
each state receiving federal highway aid "shall have a State highway
department which shall have adequate powers, and be suitably equipped
and organized to discharge to the satisfaction of the Secretary the
duties required by this title." Regulations of the Secretary of Commerce
elaborate on this requirement as follows:
Each State highway department, maintained in conformity with
23 U.S.C. 302, shall be authorized, by the laws of the State, to make
Stat. 894 (1958), as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1965).
1176 Stat. 1146 (1962), 23 U.S.C. § 133(b) (1965).
3176 Stat. 1148 (1962), 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1965). "Urbanized area" is a term used
by the Bureau of the Census. In Montana, application of this definition brings the
metropolitan areas of Billings and Great Falls within the scope of § 134. U. S.
Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Instructional Memorandum 50-2-63,
p. A-1 (March 27, 1964).
--72 Stat. 902 (1958), 23 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1965).
-A state highway department must keep a transcript of every hearing held under
this section and must send the transcript to the Bureau of Public Roads. The certification and transcript are prerequisites to the execution of a formal project agreement between the Secretary of Commerce and the state highway department.
IT72 Stat. 899
(1958), as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 121(c) (1965).
3272
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final decisions for the State in all matters relating to, and to enter
into, on behalf of the State, all contracts and agreements for projects
and to take such other actions on behalf of the State as may be
necessary
to comply with the Federal laws and the regulations in this
38
part.
and
Subsequent to authorization by the Administrator to proceed
with a project or any undertaking thereunder, no change shall be
made which will increase the cost of the project to the Federal Government or alter the termini, character or3 9scope of the work without
prior authorization by the Administrator.

The basic policy here is proper. Highway construction contracts
have often been subject to political corruption. An efficient, professional
highway department should be free from outside influence in matters of
letting contracts and dealing with contractors. But these regulations
have the side effect of discouraging legitimate review of location decisions. By virtue of the standing to sue requirements, ordinarily no one
can seek judicial review of a location decision until the highway department signs a project agreement. 40 In order to have enough money on
hand for awards, the state highway department usually waits until a
project agreement with the Bureau of Public Roads is signed before it
brings condemnation suits. A court or other reviewing authority thus
risks the responsibility for causing federal aid to be lost to the state if it
41
delays construction or requires a change in a planned route.
The Bureau can promote a measure of review and cooperative planning through its regulations. Pursuant to the urban transport planning
requirement, 42 the Bureau requires each highway department to execute
a memorandum of understanding with local governments in the urban
area. This is not intended to create a local veto over location decisions.
"If there is an unwillingness on the part of a local political unit within
the entire urban area to participate in the transportation planning
process in such area," the Bureau says, "a determination shall be made
as to whether the percentage of the urban area affected is such to negate
an effective planning process for the whole area. ' 43 The determination
is to be made by the Bureau. But local governments which approach
highway departments with a determination to drive a good bargain can
secure meaningful planning agreements.
-23 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1964).
-23 C.F.R. § 1.13 (1964).
'°A proper plaintiff, if not a condemnee, must plead some form of irreparable injury,
note 57 infra, and the injury is not certain while the highway department is still
able to alter its route.
'After the project agreement is signed, the project must be completed in two
years and a few months or the federal subsidy will be withdrawn, note 27 supra. An
example of this risk was demonstrated in Washington. Washington law provides for
arbitration when city or county governments disagree with the state highway commission on freeway location plans. See text at n. 145 et seq. infra. The City of
Bellevue obtained arbitration of the location of a proposed freeway in the city after
the highway commission had signed a project agreement with the Bureau of Public
Roads. The arbitrator ordered the route modified and the Bureau refused to pay the
federal share of the added costs of the modification. Letter from Delbert W.
Johnson, Ass 't Atty. Gen '1. of Washington, Jan. 5, 1966.
'"Supra note 34.
"Instructional Memorandum 50-2-63, note 34 supra, at 4.
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Fish and game values are similarly protected by a memorandum
issued to the state highway departments in 1963.11 Highway construction
dictated solely by engineering considerations has destroyed the fishing
values of many streams in the nation. The main causes have been
straight-line routes down valleys, borrowing gravel from the stream bed
for construction, and channelling streams to avoid eddies under bridge
embankments. 45 For several years, Senator Lee Metcalf introduced bills
to authorize the Interior Department to review and comment on federalaid highway construction plans for the purpose of suggesting routes and
4 6
designs to protect the fish.
The Bureau of Public Roads, prodded by these proposals, issued a
directive to the state highway departments which required the latter to
negotiate coordination agreements with the fish and game agencies in
their states. 4 7 ITnder these agreements, highway departments must: (a)
submit location and design proposals to the fish and game agency before
public hearings are held, (b) give the fish and game agency notice of
hearings and receive the comments and recommendations of the fish and
game agency, and (c) report to the Bureau of Public Roads the comments
of the fish and game agency, the particulars in which the highway
departnient has chosen to disregard the wishes of the fish and game
agency, and the reasons by which the highway department justifies its
own position. The Bureau considers this information before it signs the
project agreement.
Since the thought processes of federal highway engineers are closer
to those of state highway engineers than those of state fish and game
officials, this procedure would not seem to extend much protection to
the fish. However, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife in the Interior Department conducted a survey of the state fish and game officials
and found nearly all of them convinced that the agreements had improved matters to the point where highways were no longer a major
4
threat to fish conservation.
Montana is the only state which has thus far enacted this coordination procedure into law. 49 The difference in the Montana law is that a
neutral arbitrator chosen by the two agencies settles unresolved controversies. The Bureau of Public Roads acts as the arbitrator in other jurisdictions. No cases have gone to arbitration under the Montana statute,
now three years old. "0 In over twenty cases where the Department of
"Bureau of Public Roads, Instructional Memorandum 21-5-63 (June 12, 1964).
'Hearings on Highway Beautification and Scenic Roads Program Before the Subcommittee on Public Roads of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 409-528 (1965).
4S. 2767, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962) ; S. 468, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; S. 1974,
89th Con., 1st Sess. (1965).
"Svpra note 44, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 45, at 459.
"IT. S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Highway-Fish
and Wildlife Coordination (April 1965), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 45, at 520.
I°R.C.M. 1947, § 26-1501 ff. (1965 supp.).
'Letter from Richard J. Munro, Chief, Information and Education Division, Departiment of Fish and Game, Helena, Montana, January 28, 1966.
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Fish and Game had initially objected to the Highway Departient's proposals, satisfactory agreements were negotiated.5

1

APPEALING FROM THE DECISIONS OF HIGHWAY OFFICIALS
Courts are reluctant to enter into areas of engineering technology
and political questions. State legislatures are pressured by the conditions of federal aid into committing location decisions to the unreviewable discretion of their highway departments. Against these considerations, what is the case for outside review of the highway engineers'
decisions?
There is need for conservation of natural resources and urban environments. The physical requirements of the interstate program alone
are staggering. Here is a graphic illustration of the magnitude:
The pavement area of the system, assembled in one huge parking lot, would be 20 miles square and could accommodate two-thirds
of all the motor vehicles in the United States. New right-of-way
needed amounts to 1% million acres. Total excavations will move
enough material to bury Connecticut knee-deep in dirt. Sand, gravel,
and crushed stone for the construction would build a wall 50 feet
wide and nine feet high completely around the world. The concrete
used would build six sidewalks to the moon; the tar and asphalt
would build driveways for 35 million homes. The steel will take 30
million tons of iron ore, 18 million tons of coal, and 6Y2 million tons
of limestone. Lumber and timber requirements would take all the
trees from a 400-square-mile forest. Enough culvert and drain pipe
is needed to equal the2 combined water and sewer systems in six cities
the size of Chicago.
When this much of the earth is to be taken, society wants to see it taken
carefully. The Danielsen case reflects the desire to conserve good farmland when other land was available, equally good for highways but less
valuable for farming. The results of the fish and game coordination show
that trout streams can be conserved without bringing highway construction to a halt.
A related consideration is the economic impact of a highway. A new
bypass can destroy the economic vitality of a small town dependent on
roadside business. The location of interchanges on freeways is a substantial factor in future growth and land use-but highway engineers have
53
located interchanges with little regard for town and city planning.
Resource management and city planning are not courses in the civil
engineering curriculum. Highway engineers are well trained in technical
design, building highways with the lowest construction costs, keeping
grades and curves gradual to save lives and fuel. For the engineer the
technical factors are more meaningful, and of higher relevance, than the
social factors. If social factors are to be taken into account, then other
mLetter from John C. Peters, Habitat Evaluation Leader, Department of Fish and
Game, Helena, Montana, February 11, 1966.
5'U. S. DEP'T OF CoMMECE, BURFAU or PUBLIc

ROADs,

AMERICA'S LIFELINE: FEDERAL

AID FoR HIGHWAYS 11, quoted in SMERK, op. cit. supra note 19, at 131.
OSee Covey, Freeway Interchanges: A Case Study and jan Overview, 45 MARQ. L. REv.

21, 36 (1961).
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professions need to be involved in highway planning.5 4 One way to have
broad-gauge planning is to require the highway department to justify
a particular routing. The justification should include a careful consideration of the social factors involved, and should be subject to judicial
review.
Another consideration is "due process" in a general sense. "Highway
condemnation proceedings of necessity are brutal at best," the Supreme
Court of Michigan has said, and "when due appeal is made to the courts
for review of such proceedings, it is the plain duty of the latter to see
that the requirements of Constitutionally authorized law are strictly
observed . . . . "5 This theory has supported nearly all cases of judicial
review of highway planning. Since most state legislatures have not provided for broad "social" planning, the courts have been unable to exercise their reviewing function to promote such planning. Judicial review
has been confined to technicalities.
Judicial review of route locations is limited by the requirement that
a challenger have standing to sue. The remedies, if any, in eminent domain proceedings are available only to condemnors. Where necessity
decisions have been left to discretion of the highway department, the
property owner may attack necessity only by pleading abuse of discretion by the highway department. 56 As a general rule, no person may
intervene in an eminent domain suit unless his property is actually involved. 57 Lacking, therefore, any remedy at law, a party protesting the location of a highway which will not take his property usually seeks an
injunction. Acts of highway officials may be enjoined at the behest of
a plaintiff who:
1. will suffer irreparable injury,
2. has no adequate remedy at law, and
3. complains that the act of the highway official is illegal or
unauthorized. 58
Irreparable injury may be alleged when the proposed highway would
damage nearby property by its nuisance effect. If the noise, fumes,
runoff, etc., will depress the value of nearby property, the general rule is
that no compensation may be claimed. 59 Thus, there is no adequate remedy at law. Irreparable injury may also be alleged by taxpayers. Although taxpayers' suits against the federal government may not be
maintained, such suits against state government officials are allowed in
5

1A firm of landscape architects in Philadelphia has devised a method of analyzing
factors in location planning, using transparent overlay maps. WALLACE,
the "social"
McHARG, ROBERTS AND TODD, A COMPREHENSIVE HIGHWAY ROUTE SELECTION METHOD
APPLIED TO 1-95 BETWEEN THE DELAWARE AND RAaITAN RIVERS, NEW JERSEY (1966).

5Lookholder v. Ziegler, 354 Mich. 28, 91 N.W.2d 834, 839 (1958).
mSupra note 1.

5
Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1292(1958).
"43 C. J. S. Injunctions § 113 (1945); 39 0. J. S. Highways § 89 (1944).

'*NICHOLS, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 6.31, 6.32; Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MICH.
In some jurisdictions, when the highway department
L. REV. 1373, 1402 (1965).

takes property restricted by a neighborhood covenant of quiet use, owners of nearby
property can claim compensation for the destruction of the covenant. See State
Highway Comm'n v. McNeil, 238 Ark. 244, 381 S.W.2d 425 (1964).
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most jurisdictions. 60 Since the states must pay part of the costs of federal-aid highway projects, state taxpayers may hold their highway officials to account for their actions. 61 Taxpayers' suits are class actionsone judgment is res judicata on all taxpayers similarly situated-with
the advantage that a highway project can be reviewed in one suit and
not be delayed by piecemeal litigation.62
Abuse of discretion is illegal or unauthorized action. When the legislature delegated its power to locate highways to the highway department, the legislature assumed that the discretion would be reasonably
exercised.6 3 But a challenge, based on this theory, to highway department
action will not permit the merits of alternative locations to be argued.
The few decisions granting relief from a highway department's abuse
of discretion involved clear cases of procedural abuse.6 4 In a leading
decision on this point, United States v. Carmack,6 5 the Supreme Court
defined an arbitrary and capricious decision as a decision made without
adequate determining principle and without reason. The high court dissolved an order enjoining federal officials from condemning a munici-

pal park for a post office site,66 characterizing the arbitrary-and-capricious finding of the lower court to have been, in effect and erroneously,
a finding of "the comparative undesirability and lack of necessity for the
selection of that site."

67

If the federal requirements impose a duty upon state highway officials, then the legality of the acts of the state officials may be tested
against the federal standards. Most of the decision-making standards in
"Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L. J. 895 (1960).
5
Linnecke v. Dep't of Highways, 76 Nev. 26, 348 P.2d 235 (1960); Weaver v. Ives,
152 Conn. 586, 210 A.2d 661 (1965).
"Taxpayers' Suits, supra note 60, at 803.
"See State v. Professional Realty Co., 144 W. Va. 652, 110 S.E.2d 616, 623 (1959).
"King County v. Thielman, 59 Wash. 2d 586, 369 P.2d 503 (1962) (fraud); Hunt v.
Ziegler, 350 Mich. 309, 86 N.W.2d 345 (1957) (bad faith). These were condemnation
suits. See Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 465, 480 (1964).
"329 U.S. 230 (1946).
"United States v. Certain Land, 55Z. Supp. 555 (D. Mo. 1944), aff'd on other grounds
sub. nom. United States v. Carmack, 151 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1945).
"lUnited States v. Carnmk, supra note 65, at 247. The court noted that the determination of location had involved a study of twenty two sites, and that the park site
had been favored over the other leading contender in an informal straw vote of the
town's citizens.
See also Brown v. McMorran, 23 App. Div. 2d 661, 257 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1965), in
which the trial court enjoined the state from building a highway because. the New
York Superintendent of Public Works had abused his discretion by delegating that
discretion to the Federal Highway Administrator. Only tivo route alternatives had
been studied; when the Bureau of Public Roads rejected the state's project application for one route it in effect obliged the state to choose the other route. Hearings,
supra note 45, at 415-17. The court held that New York law gave the Superintendent
final authority to make location decisions and that this authority could not be
delegated. 42 Misc. 2d 211, 247 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1963). The appellate court
reversed this decision, stating that even if the Superintendent's decision to build on
the second-choice route had been coerced,
[S]ection 85 of the Highway Law directs the Superintendent of Public Works to do
all acts necessary to comply with the Federal-Aid Highway Acts and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder. This state statute evinced the clear intent of the
Legislature to secure all the funds allotted to the State by the Federal government for
the construction of roads in the interstate system. Therefore, unless the State Superintendent of Public Works complied with the conditions imposed by the Federal Highway
Administrator and secured the latter's approval, the intention of the Legislature would
be defeated. 257 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
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Title 23 of the United States Code impose duties upon the Secretary of
Commerce alone. 6 However, the requirement of holding public hearings6 9 is, arguably, a reviewable duty of the state highway officials.
Some courts have stated that only the Bureau of Public Roads may question the legal sufficiency of the hearings conducted by the state highway
department. 70
Other courts have reviewed the conduct of location hearings without
discussing the question of standing. In Binghamton Citizens' Penn-Can
Route 17 Committee v. Federick,7 1 the New York Appellate Division
treated state law, federal law, and Bureau of Public Roads regulations all
as relevant to the legal duties of the state Superintendent of Public Works.
The court considered Bureau of Public Roads requirements that hearings be
held at a "reasonably convenient time and place. '7 2 Applying them to
'the case, the court said, "That a hearing was held at one place rather than
another; and that it would be more convenient for citizens interested to
attend it here, rather than there, certainly fails to make out a case that
the hearing was not at a 'reasonably convenient' time and place. There
71
is no showing here of inconvenience worked to an oppressive degree.
74
So the plaintiffs lost, but on the merits.
Acts of state highway officials may also be illegal or unauthorized
when tested against state statutes. Precise procedures may be prescribed
for the use of the eminent domain power and courts will enforce by
injunctions the observance of such procedures. Michigan law requires
an offer to purchase every interest in property prior to condemnation.
Nevertheless, the state's highway commission sought to condemn leased
property without making any offer to the lessee for his interest. 75 Condenmation was enjoined until an offer was made to the lessee.
Michigan law also directs the commission of highways to "hear and
determine" the necessity for a taking 76 and has held that a necessity hearing conducted by a commissioner was not invalid, even though a par"See text supra at notes 30-32.
"Supra note 35.
"This view was first expressed in Piekarski v. Smith, 38 Del. Ch. 402, 153 A.2d 587
(1959) and quoted with approval in Hoffman v. Stevens, 177 F. Supp. 898 (M.D.
Pa. 1959); Linnecke v. Dep't of Highways, supra note 60, at 237; and Futch v.
Greer, 353 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1962), cert. denied 372 U. S. 319 (1963).
In Linnecke v. Dep't of Highways, the court said, "if the notice should be insufficient, if the hearing is inadequate, if the required certificate be lacking, then the
Bureau of Public Roads must determine that deficiency." But this position was
weakened in the Piekarski, Linncke, and Futch cases when the respective courts
went on to find, as a question of fact, that notice and hearings were legally sufficient. In Hoffman v. Stevens, the court dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust
state court remedies.
"7 App. Div. 2d 170, 180 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1958).
72U. S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Policy and Procedure Memorandum 20-8 (August 10, 1956).
"Binghamton Citizens' Penn-Can Route 17 Comm. v. Federick, supra note 71, at 915.
7"See also, Town of Clearmont v. State Highway Comm'n, ...... Wyo ....... , 357 P.2d 470
(1960).
"Lockholder v. Ziegler, supra note 55.
7OMTCH. STAT. ANN. § 8.175 (1958).
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ticular route had been proposed by the highway commission." Subsequently, a hearing conducted by one of the commissioner's assistants was
held invalid, the court finding the assistant an interested party and
disqualified from conducting the hearing. He was interested, the court
said, "to the extent of keeping his job by carrying into effect the highway planning of his appointing superior, a part of which planning was
the taking of appellant's property." 8
Another technical limitation sometimes placed upon the eminent domain power of state highway departments concerns property already
dedicated to another public use. Urban parkland, in particular, is a
tempting site for highway planners, as it offers lower land acquisition
costs. But open space, scarce in many cities, has its defenders. A federal
district court has held that it can restrain a park authority from turning
over a portion of a park for use as a highway.79 Parties who had granted
the land to the United States conditioned upon a permanent dedication
to park use, and abutting property owners were found to have status to
sue. The court further said that any citizen using a park is a cestui que
use with standing to ask equity to protect his rights as a user. The defense
of sovereign immunity was rejected on the theory that an illegal act of
the sovereign's officer was not an act of the sovereign. 80
When a park has been created by private grant, with a perpetual
park use condition, the public authority controlling the park is a trustee
accountable to the grantor or to park users.8 ' As a trustee, the authority
may not voluntarily convert the park to an inconsistent use. 2 However,
the trustee of a park which is certain to be condemned may voluntarily
dispose of it.83
When the highway department seeks to condemn park property,
without the consent of the park authority, the eminent domain power is
superior to the public trust, and a park may be taken. But the legislative
"New Products Corp. v. Ziegler, 352 Mich. 73, 88 N.W.2d 528 (1958).

"Glass v. Mackie, 370 Mich. 482, 122 N.W.2d 651, 653 (1963).
IgArchbold v. McLaughlin, 181 F. Supp. 175 (D.D.C. 1960).
Id. at 179. The Glover-Archbold controversy was mooted before it could be tried on
the merits. In a section of the National Capital Transit Act, Congress ordered a
five-year moratorium on new highway construction in the section of the District
encompassing the park. 86th Cong., 2d sess., P.L. 86-669, § 204(b)(2); 74 Stat.
540, 40 U.S.C. § 664(b)(2) (1961). In a similar action, a group of Connecticut
residents sought to enjoin the state highway department from condemning park land
for an interstate route. The complaint based standing to sue on plaintiffs' positions
as taxpayers, as owners of nerby property threatened by a nuisance, and as beneficiaries of a public trust in the maintenance of the park. Holding that sovereign
immunity is no bar when the defendant official acted illegally or without authority,
the court of errors reversed the trial court. Weaver v. Ives, supra note 61. The
trial court was ordered to pass upon the legality of the proposed condemnation, but
the issue was mooted by a new state law providing that state officials wishing to
condemn municipal parkland must secure an order of necessity from the local
superior court and must show at this proceeding that no equivalent property is
available for the highway or other facility. CONN. STAT. ANN. (1958) § 7-131(k)
(1965 supp.).
"Archbold v. McLaughlin, supra note 79; Stratton v. City of Riverton, 74 Wyo. 379,
287 P.2d 627 (1955).
"Annot., 144 A.L.R. 486, 492 (1943).
' Welch v. City and County of Denver, 141 Colo. 587, 349 P.2d 352 (1960).
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grant of condemnation power will be construed strictly against the taker
when property dedicated to another public use is involved. Thus, a
grant of eminent domain power, in general terms, to take "property"
did not include specific power to take a hospital,8 4 a school,8 5 or a water
or sewer system.8 6 But when the eminent domain power is created with
reference to all property, private or public, the highway department may
87
take parks and other dedicated lands.
Montana law is an exception to the prevailing rule. When the highway commission seeks a necessity order to take property dedicated to
another public use, the court must decide which use-the highway or the
existing use-is a "more necessary" public use.88 Cemeteries, however,
are protected against condemnation for any other public use. 9
Dedicated property may not be protected against the needs of the
Interstate System even when state law puts it off limits. Section 107 of
Title 23 provides that a state highway department may request the Secretary of Commerce to condemn lands needed for interstate routes. If
the Secretary finds that the highway department is either unable to
acquire such lands or cannot acquire them with sufficient promptness,
the federal eminent domain power may be used to take the necessary
lands or interests. The legislative history of this section indicates a Congressional intent to use the procedure only when states were unable to
control access to the highways by denying the right of access to abutting
property owners.90 But this procedure has been invoked to take a park 9'
and cemeteries 92 which were protected by state law.
REVIEW BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The most acerbated location controversies arise in cities and towns.
Congress tried to alleviate this situation in 1962 when it added Section
134 to Title 23. This provision requires interstate and other federal-aid
projects in metropolitan areas with populations of more than fifty thousand to be based upon a continuous, comprehensive transportation
"Society of the New York Hospital v. Johnson, 5 N.Y.2d 102, 154 N.E.2d 550 (1958).
'Dep't of Public Works and Buildings v. Ells, 23 Ill. 2d 619, 179 N.E.2d 679 (1962).
'Commonwealth v. Mass. Tpk. Auth., 346 Mass. 250, 191 N.E.2d 481, 484 (1963).
"State Highway Comm'n v. Greensboro City Bd. of Education, 265 N.C. 35, 143
S.E.2d 87 (1965); People v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal. App. 2d 558, 4 Cal. Rptr.
531 (1960).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9905.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 9-118.
90U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News, 84th Cong., 2d sess., v. 2, 2825 (1956).
O'United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 209 F. Supp. 483 (S.D. Ill. 1962), aff'd
sub noin. United States v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District of Peoria, Ill., 314
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
'United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 175 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Tenn. 1959); Eden
Memorial Park Ass'n v. Dep't of Public Works, 59 Cal. 2d 412, 380 P.2d 390
(1963). The Eden Memorial Park decision vacated a lower court order enjoining
the state highway department from accepting the federally-condemned cemetery "to
the subversion of the plainly declared policy of the state."
Eden Memorial Park
Ass'n v. Dep't of Public Works, 27 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (1962).
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planning process.9 3 This meets part of the problem. But transportation
planning is only a part of city planning; the city resident is a traveller
for a fraction of his day. He needs land also for work, housing, services,
and recreation. When these uses compete for a piece of urban land, the
allocation is a political decision which should be made within the municipal government framework. But most state highway departments are
authorized to choose routes with as much discretion in cities as in the
94
countryside.
In Montana the state highway commission may exercise its powers
in an incorporated town subject to the consent of the municipal government.9 5 This limitation is also present in the laws of Pennsylvania 96 and
Michigan.9 7 In five other states the highway departments are authorized
to lay out limited access highways, "provided that within cities and towns
such authority shall be subject to such municipal consent as may be provided by law."98 Other states modified the prerequisite of local consent
after the impact of the Interstate System program was felt. An Ohio law
repealed municipal control over route locations for the federal primary
and Interstate Systems.9 9 Municipal governments were given instead the
right to argue the merits of location decisions in appeals to the courts. 10 0
In Minnesota, municipal consent is necessary for all highways except
those in the Interstate System. 10 If the municipal government opposes
an interstate route proposal, it may carry the dispute with the highway
commission to a neutral arbitrator. Washington also has an arbitration
procedure, available to both town and county governments, which affects
all limited-access highway locations in the state.' 0 2 The arbitration procedure has never been invoked in Minnesota' 0 3 and only twice in Wash04
ington.1
O'Supra note 34.
"By statute, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121.4, §§ 205, 501 (Smith-Hurd, 1965
supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-553 (1965 supp.); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6674w-1; by court decision, see City of Mt. Vernon v. East Hudson Parkway Auth.,
45 Misc. 2d 471, 257 N.Y.S.2d 51, 209 N.E.2d 563 (Sup. Ct. 1965), atf'd, 23 App.
Div. 2d 849, 259 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1965); Harlan v. City of Tucson, 82 Ariz. 111, 309
P.2d 244 (1957) (dicta).
9
R.C.M. 1947, § 32-4305 (1965 supp.).
"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2391.2(d) (1961); Pressures in the Process of Administrative Decision, supra note 25, at 543.
97MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.1094(2) (1958); City of Dearborn v. Mich. Turnpike Auth.,
344 Mich. 37, 73 N.W.2d 544, 553 (1955).
98ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-2203 (1957); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 173 (1965 Supp.);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177.230 (1963);

MISS. CODE ANN. § 8039-03

(1956);

N. D.

CENT. CODE § 24-01-30 (1960). The Supreme Court of Delaware is the only court
which has construed this phrase. The court held that where some other statute
specifically required the state highway department to obtain the consent of the
municipality for some aspect of construction, such as closing off a local street, that
consent must be secured. Piekarski v. Smith, supra note 70, at 593.
wO io REv. CODE § 5521.01 (1965 Supp.).
ImCity of Lakewood v. Thormyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960).
'° MINN. STAT. ANN. § 161.17(2) (1960).
"'See text at notes 119-123 infra.
'"Letter from Dean M. Wenger, Preliminary Design Engineer, Minnesota Highway
Commission, December 21, 1965.
'"Letter from Delbert W. Johnson, supra note 41.
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Other cities have found a power of municipal consent more indirectly.
The famous San Francisco "freeway revolt" is based upon a statute which
requires the highway commission to negotiate an agreement with the city
council or county supervisors to close off local streets for freeway construction. 0 5
Another form of conflict between municipal governments and state
highway departments arises when the state proposes to bypass a town.
The larger urban areas, already choked with traffic, welcome such proposals, but a bypass is an economic blow to many small towns, especially
in the west. Montana requires the highway commission to secure the
consent of local governments before diverting traffic from the town by
building a new highway. 10 6 This consent is not required for bypasses in
10 7
the Interstate System.
In Wyoming, a bypass must be approved by a vote of the citizens of
the bypassed town.108 The state supreme court construed this statute as
applying to relocations of existing routes. 10 9 An interstate highway is a
new, not an existing, route, thus a traffic-diverting interstate was held
validly located without the approved of the voters. 110 In New Mexico, all
bypass routings must be approved by the local government except that
Interstate System bypasses require such approval only when the town
has a population of at least 500 and no more than 50,000.111 Utah law
duplicates federal requirements by specifying that public hearings be
112
held on bypass routings.
NEW APPROACHES TO HIGHWAY PLANNING
Three states-Vermont, Washington, and California-have revised
their highway planning procedures to limit the sole discretion of their
highway departments and to increase the influence of other voices in
route location decisions. Each legislature has taken a different approach,
the common factor in all three being the focus on the planning stage of
route location.
In Vermont, the state highway board is directed to hold a hearing
on the necessity of a new highway and of the location proposed for such
highway." 3 After the hearing, the board must petition the local superior
court for an order of necessity." 4 The court conducts a hearing on the
05

' CAL. STREETS & H'WAYS CODE § 100.2

(1965). The board of supervisors of San
Francisco has refused to agree to the closing of any city streets for the highway
commission's current freeway proposals. The commission could construct its freeways
underground or perhaps elevated so as to close off no streets, and thus proceed
without the city's concurrence. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. Calif. 173.
°R.C.M. 1947, § 32-1628(1965 supp.).
'TMIbid.
10CWYO. STAT. ANN. § 24-80 (1957).
luTown of Clearinont v. State Highway Comm 'n, supra note 74.
n°lbid.
"'N. M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-51 (1965 supp.).
"2UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-15 (1965 supp.).
"3VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 222 (1965 supp.).
"'VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 224 (1965 supp.).
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necessity of the board's route.1 15 At the court hearing, "if any person
owning or having an interest in the land to be taken or affected appears
and objects," the court orders the highway board to proceed to prove its
case. The court is empowered to find necessity or the lack of necessity
and may further "modify or alter the proposed taking in such respect
as to the court may seem proper. .

.

. The burden of proof of the neces-

sity of the taking shall be upon the highway board and shall be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence, and the exercise of reasonable discretion upon the part of the highway board shall not be presumed." 1 6 The court's power with regard to the merits of alternate location is broad. The court "may find from the evidence that another route
or routes are preferable in which case the board shall proceed in accordance with section 222.""1 Vermont's highway planning is set in the adversary rather than the administrative process. Standard trial procedure
is applied to highway planning-the state's engineer may be extensively
cross-examined about the cost and design features of the state's proposal
11 8
and alternate routes.
In the state of Washington the highway commission must hold public
hearings on freeway locations. 1 9 The hearing is open to individuals as
well as to the local governments. An owner of property abutting the
proposed route, who will be deprived of access to the route, may appear
as a formal party to the hearing and may submit counterproposals for the
location of the highway.' 20 The commission is directed to give reasonable consideration to such counterproposals.' 2' Individuals otherwise
situated, whether as condemnees or as interested citizens, may speak at
the hearing but are not entitled to reasonable consideration of their
122
testimony.
After the hearing, decision of the commission is subject to two forms
of review. If the city or county government objects to the routing it
5

n VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 227

(1965 supp.). Notice of the hearing must be served
on all in-path property owners and affected towns. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 226
(1965 supp.).
'-'Supra note 115.
u 7Ibid.
ueState Highway Bd. v. Loomis, 122 Vt. 125, 165 A.2d 572, 574 (1960).
'"The commission must give notice to city and county governments affected by the
commission's proposed route. Such notice must illustrate the physical appearance of
the proposed route and must state how the commission has considered local land and
transportation planning in determining its route. Laws of Washington 1965, ch.
75, § 2. The legislature in 1965 revised a set of statutes which had been in existence
for several years. These appear in WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 47.52 (1965).
tm
Laws of Washington 1965, ch. 75, § 33. In Deaconness Hospital v. State Highway
CommIn, ......
Wash. 2d ......
403 P.2d 54 (1965), the state supreme court held that
property adjacent to a freeway is not abutting property when the freeway is
elevated and the adjacent property would continue to have access to the street
underneath the freeway.
'ind. § 3. "Reasonable consideration" has been construed to require a written statement of the reasons for the. rejection of counter-proposals. In State ex rel. Duvall
v. City Council of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 598, 392 P.2d 1003 (1964), a routing decision
of the Council was upset because of the Council's failure to give "reasonable consideration. "I
tm
Supra note
§ 3.
Published
by 120,
ScholarWorks
at University of Montana, 1965

17

Montana Law
Review, Vol. LAW
27 [1965],
Iss. 2, Art. 2
MONTANA
REVIEW

[Vol. 27,

may demand arbitration.123 Owners of abutting property who have been
parties to the hearing, as defined above, may appeal to the courts for a
review as prescribed by the state administrative procedure act. 124 Under
this act, a court may reverse an administrative decision upon finding that
the commission's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions were: "(a)
in violation of constitutional provisions; or (b) in excess of the statutory
jurisdiction of the agency; or (c) made on unlawful procedure; or (d)
affected by other error of law; or (e) unsupported by material and substantive evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or (f) arbi12 5
trary or capricious.

''

The procedures of Vermont and Washington have not resulted in a.
slowdown of the Interstate program in those states. As of September 30,
1965, Vermont had all its planned mileage classed as "work in progress"
or "open to traffic" while Washington had a greater percentage of its
26
mileage open to traffic than the nation as a whole.
In California, the highway department, on request of any city or
county affected, must present graphic portrayals of selected route alternatives, illustrating the general appearance of the proposed location and
alternative locations. 27 Under prior procedures, the highway department had no duty to describe alternatives to its own proposal.
The unfortunate result.., was that interests affected by a given
routing alternative, where they are financially able, are forced to
rely upon their own resources to present to the commission an alternative to the recommendation of the engineer, and the expense and
seeming futility of this process tends to discourage those lacking the
resources for independent analyses.
Such a situation would not appear to be in the public interest. 12s
A previous statute requiring that highways should be laid out on the
"most direct and practicable" locations as determined by the commission has been repealed ;129 and local planning agencies have been given the
right to a hearing on the "most logical segment to be studied for route
'"Supra note 120, § 5. The neutral chairman of the arbitration panel must be a
licensed civil engineer or a recognized city planner. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
47.52.150 (1965). The decision of the arbitrator is binding upon both parties.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 47.52.180 (1962).
"-4Supra note 120, § 6.
'WWASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04.130(6) (1963).
'EU. S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Quarterly Report on the Federal
Aid Highway Program, December 31, 1965 (Feb. 9, 1966).
Miles
Preliminary
status or not yet Work in progress Open to traffic
Total
in progress
United States ............ 2,878.9 ( 7%) 1.6,936.3 (41%) 21,184.8
(52%)
41,000
Washington
.............78.7 (11%)
264.5 (36%)
381.7 (53.%)
724.9
Vermont
----------------- 0
211.3 (68%)
109.3 (34%)
320.6
""CAL. STREETS & H'WAYS CODE § 75.6 (1965 supp.).
(Hereafter this will be cited
ST. & H. C. A.)
mCalif. Assembly Interim Committee on Natural Resources, Planning and Public
Works, Reports v. 25, no. 3-part I, "Highway and Freeway Planning," 6 (1965).
See also ST. & H. C. A. § 103, and People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 340 P.2d
598, 603 (1959).
'ST.
& H. C. A. § 90.
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selection" before the highway commission begins a route selection
study.130
The commission is directed to employ full-time hearing officers and
to require such hearing officers to compile full transcripts of hearings."'
The commission is also required to prepare a public report with every
route selection, discussing the impact of the chosen route. 132 The report
is to include the consideration given to driver benefits, community values,
recreational and park values, historical and aesthetic values, property
values, state and local public facilities, local street traffic, and total
projected regional transportation requirements. The Committee on Natural Resources, Planning, and Public Works voiced "serious questions
concerning the agency's consideration of the total impact of a given route
alternative" and recommended the above measure to ensure full and care33
ful consideration of the non-engineering factors in route selection.'
California now has the most detailed selection procedure in the nation, but the highway committee still has sole responsibility for seeing
that the law is observed. Courts are forbidden to review the commission
on the traditional grounds of fraud, bad faith, or arbitrary or capricious
action.13 4 Another statute provides that "failure of the department or
the commission to comply with the requirements of this article shall not
invalidate any action of the commission as to the adoption of a routing
for any state highway, nor shall such failure be admissible evidence in
any litigation for the acquisition of rights of way or involving the allo3 5
cation of funds for the construction of the highway.'
CONCLUSION
A state that would bring highway planning into an equitable relationship with other social needs may choose from a variety of formulae.
There is the adversary system, highway department vs. property owners,
with a judge making necessity and location decisions. This is the Vermont approach, and less explicitly, the Montana approach."36 There is
the California approach, leaving ultimate decisions to the highway commission but spelling out planning, design, and explication procedures
in considerable detail. Or there is the arbitration approach of Washington, Minnesota, and Montana (fish and game), where other units of government may argue for their land-use plans against highway departments.
The optimum highway location process would probably combine elements of all three approaches. Detailed decision procedures are excellent,
but they do not protect the individual unless he can ask a court to enforce
MST.

& H. C. A. § 210.4 (1965 supp.).

'3ST.

& H. C. A. § 210.5 (1965 supp.).

'aST. & H. C. A. § 75.7 (1965 supp.).
'IHighway and Freeway Planning", note 128 supra at 6.
lSSupra note 128.
2ST. & H. C. A. § 215.
"mThe difference being that a Vermont court passes on the merits of the proposed
route per se while a Montana court passes on the merits of a route only in the
context of a proposed taking, as in Danielsen.
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them. Arbitration is probably too time-consuming to be available for
every aggrieved individual, so the courts would have to stay in the picture. But it is doubtful that the Vermont adversary approach would be
feasible in more populous states. If the sort of review accorded abutting
property owners in Washington were available to individuals generallyperhaps as taxpayers, to avoid piecemeal litigation-the courts would not
be overburdened. The judicial role would be limited to finding whether
decision procedures had been observed and whether sufficient facts supported highway department determinations. Arbitration-the only full
review on the merits-would be available when responsible governmental
units such as cities and fish and game commissions were convinced that
the public interest would be damaged by a particular highway routing.
In conclusion, it must be observed that many criticisms of the highway engineers stem from the wording of the federal statutes. Given the
language of the urgency clause, the deadline date of 1972, and the
lapsing-funds provision, the highway builders have been forced to build
now and ask-or answer-questions later. They have been guilty of
responding well to a clear statutory mandate. While Congress wanted
to leave location decisions to the states, the effect of federal policy on
state highway planning has undeniably been profound.
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